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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
BRYAN JAY STEPHENS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 950452-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals the denial of his motion to suppress and his convictions for 
felony and misdemeanor drug offenses. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to suppress evidence 
since defendant's consent to search under the seat of his car objectively included 
consent to search a closed container where the drugs were located? This Court 
reviews factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to suppress evidence for 
clear error, and will find clear error only if the trial court's factual findings are not 
adequately supported in the record. State v. Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Utah 
1996) (citing State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 854 (Utah 1992); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 
932, 935-936 (Utah 1994)). However, this Court reviews the trial court's conclusions 
of law based on such facts under a correctness standard, according no deference to the 
trial court's legal conclusions. IsL 
2. Did the trial court's instruction to the jury cure any error in the 
prosecutor's closing argument comment that "you all know the impact that this 
type of offense has"? Has defendant established a reasonable likelihood that, but 
for this comment, he would have been acquitted? This Court will reverse on the 
basis of prosecutorial misconduct only if defendant has shown that 
the actions or remarks of [prosecuting] counsel call to the attention of the 
jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its 
verdict and, if so, under the circumstances of the particular case, . . . the 
error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable 
result. . . . 
State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah App. 1996); accord State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 
483, 486 (Utah 1984); State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Utah App. 1994), 
cert, denied, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1995). In determining whether a given statement 
constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, the statement must be viewed in light of "the 
totality of the evidence presented at trial." Stevenson, 884 P.2d at 1290 (citing State v. 
Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah App. 1992). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 14: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the person or thing to be seized.1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in an Information with one count of unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2)(a)(I) (1991); one count of unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance (marijuana), a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §58-37-8(2)(a)(I) (1991); and one count of unlawful possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37a-5 
(1981) (R. 5-7). 
Defendant moved to suppress the methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug 
paraphernalia seized from his car after he consented to a search following a traffic stop 
1
 Defendant has not asserted or briefed a separate state constitutional claim 
(Def. Br. at 1 n.l). Any state constitutional argument should be deemed waived. State 
v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656, 660-661 (Utah 1985). 
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(R. 25-31). The State provided a written response (R. 33-40). After a hearing (R. 
163-195), the trial court denied defendant's motion (R. 41-46). 
After the State rested its case-in-chief at trial, defendant renewed his motion to 
suppress (R. 293-295), which the trial court again denied (R. 296-297). After a jury 
trial, defendant was convicted on all three counts (R. 93-95; 366-369), and was 
sentenced to zero-to-five years at the Utah State Prison on count one, and concurrent 
terms of 180 days each in Salt Lake County Jail on counts two and three (R. 136-139). 
The execution of defendant's sentence was stayed pending three years probation. Id. 
Defendant timely appealed (R. 136-139, 144-145). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Point I. For purposes of the motion to suppress, the parties stipulated to the 
facts in the police report which was attached to the State's response to defendant's 
motion (R. 164-167; g££ R. 39-40). After the hearing on the motion, the trial court 
made the following findings of fact: 
1. On February 20, 1995, Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff Dave 
Broadhead witnessed the defendant Bryan Jay Stephens violate the traffic 
code by failing to properly signal while turning left (eastbound) at 300 
West and 4500 South. 
2. Deputy Broadhead activated his overhead lights to effect a traffic stop. 
The defendant did not immediately stop and made several rapid 
movements to the right prior to stopping. As Deputy Broadhead exited 
his vehicle and approached, the defendant made another rapid "stuffing" 
movement to the right. 
3. The defendant denied making any stuffing movements when asked 
about his actions prior and after stopping by Deputy Broadhead. In 
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response to Deputy Broadhead's query if he had any concealed weapons 
or contraband under the seat, the defendant said; [sic] "No, you're free to 
look if you want." 
4. Because of the defendant's apparent extreme nervousness, Deputy 
Broadhead explained to the defendant his concern for his safety as well as 
the possibility that the defendant had placed a weapon or contraband 
under the front seat. Deputy Broadhead requested permission to check 
under the seat and the defendant responded "Go right ahead." 
5. The defendant exited the vehicle and Deputy Broadhead looked under 
the right front seat where he observed the suspicious movement. Deputed 
[sic] Broadhead limited his search to the right front area and found a 
brown leather case under the right front seat. On opening the leather 
case, Deputy Broadhead found various controlled substances as well as 
drug paraphernalia. 
6. The defendant denied knowledge or ownership of the leather case at 
which time Deputy Broadhead then Mirandized the defendant and arrested 
him for possession of controlled substances and drug paraphernalia. 
(R. 41-42; £££ addendum A; sL R. 39-40).2 
Point II. The following is the pertinent extract from the prosecutor's closing 
argument: 
You may say, "Well, yeah we have got Mr. Stephens charged with 
a crime. There is no victim here with regard to those offenses. We have 
only taken roughly two hours to present the case to you today, why all of 
2
 Defendant argues that, in its written ruling, "the trial court failed to address" 
scope of consent (Def. Br. at 5). However, defendant failed to raise scope of consent 
as an issue in his motion to suppress or memorandum in support (R. 25-31), and only 
vaguely raised it at the end of his brief rebuttal argument in the pretrial hearing on the 
motion (R. 193-194). Defendant explicitly raised it as an issue for the first time when 
he renewed his suppression motion at trial after the challenged evidence had already 
been admitted and the State had rested its case (R. 293-294). §££ State v. Willard. 801 
P.2d 189 n.l (Utah App. 1990). Therefore, the trial court's summary treatment of the 
issue and denial of the renewed motion, (R. 294-297), can be explained by the timing 
and perfunctory manner in which defendant raised it. 
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the big fuss and bother to occupy your time for a day? Well, you all 
know the impact that this type of offense has. 
MR. YOUNGBERG: Objection, judge. 
THE COURT: Sustained and Mr. Christensen I am going to ask 
that you refrain from making that argument and, members of the jury, let 
me just simply admonish you that your verdict in this case, of course, 
must be based solely and totally upon the evidence that is introduced 
during this particular case and, of course, you must not be swayed by 
public opinion or public feeling. Your decision must be based solely 
upon the evidence introduced during this case. You may proceed, Mr. 
Christensen. 
(R. 351-352; see addendum B). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court correctly denied defendant's suppression motion since the 
general consent to search a vehicle extends to the contents of unlocked containers 
found in the vehicle. Defendant does not contest that he consented to a search of his 
car. Instead, he argues that his consent to search under the passenger seat of his car 
did not extend to a brown leather case the officer found under that seat. Defendant's 
argument has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court and by this Court. 
When there is no limitation on the scope of consent, consent to search a vehicle extends 
to the contents of unlocked containers found in the vehicle. 
After the officer explained his concern that defendant had placed a weapon or 
contraband under the passenger seat, defendant volunteered, u You're free to look if 
you want." When the officer asked if he would consent to a search, defendant said"Go 
right ahead." Defendant did not place any explicit limitation on the scope of the 
6 
officer's search under the seat. Since a reasonable person would be expected to know 
that a weapon or contraband is usually carried in some kind of container, it was 
objectively reasonable for the officer to conclude that defendant's consent to search 
under the seat included his consent to search a container under the seat that might hold 
a weapon or contraband. Defendant's consent to search, therefore, extended to the 
leather case containing the incriminating drugs and paraphernalia. 
2. The trial court's instruction to the jury cured any error in the 
prosecutor's comment during closing argument that "you all know the impact that 
this type of offense has"; in any event, defendant has failed to establish a 
reasonable likelihood that, even absent this comment, he would have been 
acquitted. Defendant argues that the prosecutor's comment was so prejudicial that he 
should be granted a new trial. However, after sustaining trial defense counsel's 
objection, the trial court gave a curative instruction that was sufficient to make any 
error harmless. A jury is generally presumed to follow the trial court's instructions. In 
any event, defendant has failed to establish a reasonable likelihood that, absent the 
prosecutor's comment, he would have been acquitted. 
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ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
SUPPRESSION MOTION BECAUSE, WHEN THERE IS NO 
LIMITATION ON THE SCOPE OF CONSENT, CONSENT TO 
SEARCH A VEHICLE EXTENDS TO THE CONTENTS OF 
UNLOCKED CONTAINERS FOUND IN THE VEHICLE. 
Defendant does not contest that he consented to a search of his car. Instead, he 
argues that his consent to search under the passenger seat of his car did not extend to a 
brown leather case the officer found under that seat (Def. Br. at 5-8). Defendant's 
argument has been rejected in Florida v. Jimeno. I l l S.Ct. 1801 (1991), and State v. 
Castner. 825 P.2d 699 (Utah App. 1992), which hold that, when there is no limitation 
on the scope of consent, consent to search a vehicle extends to the contents of unlocked 
containers found in the vehicle. 
The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth 
Amendment is that of "objective" reasonableness — "what would the typical reasonable 
person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?" Florida 
v. Jimeno. I l l S.Ct. 1801, 1803-1804 (1991); acporfl State vt Casfrer, 825 P.2d 699, 
705 (Utah App. 1992). If a suspect's consent "would reasonably be understood to 
extend to a particular container, the Fourth Amendment provides no grounds for 
requiring a more explicit authorization." I*L 
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In Jimeno. the officer stopped the suspect's car after it failed to stop at a red 
light before turning. During the traffic stop, the officer told the suspect that he had 
reason to believe the suspect was carrying narcotics in his car, and asked permission to 
search the car. The suspect consented. After the occupants stepped out of the car, the 
officer went to the passenger's side, opened the door, and saw a folded, brown paper 
bag on the floor. The officer picked up the bag, opened it, and found a kilogram of 
cocaine. Id^at 1803. 
The United States Supreme Court upheld this search, concluding that it was 
reasonable for the officer to consider Jimeno's general consent to a search of his car for 
narcotics to include consent to open a particular container lying on the floor of the car 
that might contain narcotics. I$L at 1804. The Court wrote: 
In this case, the terms of the search's authorization were simple. 
Respondent granted Officer Trujillo permission to search his car, and did 
not place any explicit limitation on the scope of the search. Trujillo had 
informed respondent that he believed respondent was carrying narcotics, 
and that he would be looking for narcotics in the car. We think that it 
was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general 
consent to search respondent's car included consent to search containers 
within that car which might bear drugs. A reasonable person may be 
expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form of 
container. . . . The authorization to search in this case, therefore, 
extended beyond the surfaces of the car's interior to the paper bag lying 
on the car's floor. 
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The Supreme Court's reasoning in Jimeno should be applied in defendant's case. 
* After the officer explained his concern that defendant had placed a weapon or 
contraband under the passenger seat, defendant volunteered, "You're free to look if 
you want." When asked if he would consent to a search, defendant said, "Go right 
ahead." Defendant did not place any explicit limitation on the scope of the officer's 
search under the seat. Since a reasonable person would be expected to know that a 
weapon or contraband is usually carried in some kind of container, it was objectively 
reasonable for the officer to conclude that defendant's consent to search under the seat 
included his consent to search a container under the seat. Defendant's general consent 
to search, therefore, extended to the leather case containing the incriminating drugs and 
paraphernalia. 
The Supreme Court distinguished Jimeno from a Florida case which found that 
consent to search the trunk of a car did not include authorization to pry open a locked 
briefcase found inside the trunk. fcL at 1804 (citing State v. Wells. 539 So.2d 464 
(1989), aff d on other grounds, 110 S.Ct. 1632 (1990)). The Court concluded that "[i]t 
is very likely unreasonable to think that a suspect, by consenting to the search of his 
trunk, has agreed to the breaking open of a locked briefcase within the trunk, but it is 
otherwise with respect to a closed paper bag." LL The same rationale applies in 
defendant's case. There is no evidence the officer had to damage or destroy 
defendant's leather case to open it. 
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The denial of defendant's suppression motion is also supported by Utah case 
law. During a traffic stop in Castner- the officer observed a female passenger making 
erratic movements before the driver brought the car to a stop. The officer asked the 
driver if he had any drugs in the car. The driver said he did not, and consented to a 
search. The officer located a zipped pouch at the female passenger's feet. As the 
officer began to unzip the pouch, the passenger attempted to pull it away, but not 
before the officer found that it contained marijuana and drug paraphernalia. The 
female passenger got out of the car, holding her purse. The officer asked her if she had 
any drugs in the purse. After she said she did not, the officer removed one of several 
zipped pouches from the top of the purse and looked inside. He discovered two more 
baggies of marijuana. The officer then removed a second pouch from the purse and 
found that it contained a white powdery substance which turned out to be 
methamphetamine. A search of the car trunk revealed a gym bag containing a set of 
scales, and a suitcase containing a cardboard box which held more marijuana. Castner. 
825P.2dat701. 
Citing Jimeno. this Court upheld the search, concluding that "there is nothing in 
the undisputed facts that even remotely suggests Castner limited the scope of consent 
when [the officer] asked to search the vehicle. . . . We conclude the scope of consent 
given extended to the contents of the containers found in the interior of the vehicle and 
the trunk." I*Lat705. 
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This Court's holding in Castner fully supports the judge's ruling in defendant's 
case. Since there was no limitation on defendant's consent to search under the 
passenger seat, it extended to the contents of the leather case found under that seat. 
In sum, because defendant's argument has been rejected by the United States 
Supreme Court and this Court, the trial court's ruling denying his motion to suppress 
should not be disturbed. 
Point n 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY CURED 
ANY ERROR IN THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENT DURING 
CLOSING ARGUMENT THAT "YOU ALL KNOW THE IMPACT 
THAT THIS TYPE OF OFFENSE HAS"; IN ANY EVENT, 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH A REASONABLE 
LIKELIHOOD THAT, EVEN ABSENT THIS COMMENT, HE 
WOULD HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED. 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor's comment, "you all know the impact that 
this type of offense has," was so prejudicial that he should be granted a new trial (Def. 
Br. at 8-11). However, after sustaining trial defense counsel's objection, the trial court 
gave a curative instruction that was sufficient to make any error harmless. 
The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the prosecutor "calljed] to the 
attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its 
verdict and, if so, under the circumstances of the particular case, whether the error is 
substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, 
there would have been a more favorable result." State v. Tenney. 913 P.2d 750, 754 
12 
(Utah App. 1996) (quoting Wright. 893 P.2d at 1118 (quoting Peters. 796 P.2d at 
712)). In determining whether a given statement constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, 
"the statement must be viewed in light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial." 
LL (citing Gardner. 789 P.2d at 287). 
A prosecutor's comment to the jury that "it should be mindful of its obligation to 
society in deciding whether to return a guilty verdict" constitutes error. State v. Dunn. 
850 P.2d 1201, 1223-1224 (Utah 1993) (plain error where prosecutor argued that 
"most important factor" for jury to consider was the impact of their verdict on society; 
nevertheless, harmless error); accord State v. Andreason. 718 P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 
1986) (per curiam) (error where prosecutor argued "people are watching" and that the 
jury needed to be concerned about those "who aren't innocent but are turned loose"; 
prejudicial since marginal evidence of guilt); State v. Smith. 700 P.2d 1106, 1112 
(Utah 1985) (error where prosecutor argued "our way of life" is on trial "and how the 
public is going to perceive how the criminal law does its job"; nevertheless, harmless 
error). 
After the prosecutor's comment, when defense counsel objected, the trial court 
immediately sustained the objection, admonished counsel, and instructed the jury: 
[M]embers of the jury, let me just simply admonish you that your verdict 
in this case, of course, must be based solely and totally upon the evidence 
that is introduced during this particular case and, of course, you must not 
be swayed by public opinion or public feeling. Your decision must be 
based solely upon the evidence introduced during this case. 
13 
(R. 352). This instruction reiterated the trial court's previous instructions that the jury 
was to decide the case solely on the basis of the evidence before it (see, e.g.. R. 103-
105, 113). 
A jury is generally presumed to follow the trial court's instructions. Richardson 
v. Marsh. 107 S.Ct. 1701, 1708 (1987); State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994) 
(citing State v. Burk. 839 P.2d 880, 883-884 (Utah App.), cert.denied. 853 P.2d 897 
(Utah 1993); State v. Hodges. 517 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1974). Given that presumption, 
any error was harmless and there was no prejudice here. See Dunn. 850 P.2d at 1223-
1224; Andreason. 718 P.2d at 402. The Utah Supreme Court has remarked: 
We are able to assess only the words as they appear in the record. The 
trial judge, on the other hand, was able to note other relevant factors such 
as counsel's gestures, inflection, and expressions, as well as the jury's 
reactions. . . . Trial courts are in a much better position than are 
appellate courts to assess the overall effect of [alleged] attorney 
misconduct at trial. 
Donohue v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc., 748 P.2d 1067, 1068 (Utah 1987). The 
trial court in this case determined that a curative instruction was sufficient. Apparently 
defendant likewise deemed it sufficient since he did not move for a mistrial or a new 
trial. 
In any event, defendant has failed to establish a reasonable likelihood that, even 
absent the prosecutor's comment, he would have been acquitted. Since the comment 
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"must be viewed in light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial," Tenney. 913 
P.2d at 754, a review of the trial evidence follows. 
At about 11:00 p.m. on February 20, 1994, defendant was driving southbound 
on 300 West in Salt Lake City (R. 208-211). When he came to an intersection, 
defendant failed to signal while making a left turn onto 4500 South (R. 211). A 
uniformed officer driving a marked patrol car 40-50 feet behind defendant's car 
activated his overhead red, white, and blue lights and blinking high-beam headlights, 
and directed his spotlight into defendant's rearview mirror to initiate a traffic stop (R. 
209, 211-213, 217, 245, 270-271, 272). 
At that time of night, there were no other vehicles in the area, and the streets 
were basically empty (R. 213, 272). The officer's spotlight illuminated the interior of 
defendant's car (R. 214). Defendant failed to respond to the signal to stop, and the 
officer observed defendant make several motions leaning over to the right side of the 
car, out of sight. IEL; S££ alSQ R. 246-247, 272. Defendant drove several blocks 
before finally stopping at 80 East on 4500 South (R. 214-215, 248). There were no 
barricades, road construction, obstacles in the roadway, or other control devices that 
would have prevented defendant from pulling over as soon as the officer activated his 
lights (R. 216, 272). 
After defendant finally stopped, when the officer approached the parked car, he 
observed defendant lean to the right towards the floorboard and make another 
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"stuffing" movement under the right front seat (R. 217). At that point, the officer was 
very concerned because defendant had taken such a long distance to stop, and, based on 
his observations, the officer believed that defendant might be retrieving a weapon, 
discarding a weapon, or discarding contraband. Id. 
After making contact with defendant, the officer asked him why he was making 
all of the motions to the right side of the car (R. 218, 249). Defendant said that he did 
not know that he was (R. 218, 220). When the officer asked him if he had discarded 
anything under the seat, defendant volunteered, "No, you're free to check if you want" 
(R. 220). 
At that point, the officer first noticed defendant's heavy perspiration on his 
forehead and face, and his extreme nervousness (R. 218, 220, 242). It was a cold 
winter night, and there was no apparent reason for defendant's perspiration (R. 212, 
218-220, 240-241, 269-270, 275-276, 292-293, 308; but S££ R. 242-243). The officer 
expressed to defendant that, because defendant appeared nervous, he was concerned 
that defendant may have placed a weapon or contraband under the front seat (R. 220). 
When the officer asked if he could look, defendant said, "Go right ahead" (R. 221, 
275). Defendant got out of the car, and the officer conducted a patdown search finding 
no weapons (R. 221-222, 251). Defendant had nothing in his hands that he might have 
been reaching for during the stop (R. 262, 276-277). 
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front seat where defendant said he could look (R. 222, h **ee R 2~ '). The officer 
limited his search to the area under that seat, and found a leather pouch partially 
protruding, which he seized and opened (R. 222-223, 2891 The leather pouch was the 
i l l , Mi in iiiinlrf (fin si Jill ill1 , ( ,1 I JV1 I ,' ' II 1I "M |n ml i I linn plait" (he pouch under tin1 
passenger seat from the driver's seat, defendant would have had to lean over to his 
right (R. 233). The pouch contained two baggies of marijuana, one glass vial 
containing maryuana, a large papei bi iidle containing methamphetamine, a mirror with 
whi le pu\Mli mi lies id in J ill in i|ii iii.i sun ikiiipi pipi , l l i iet M I ut i i i j .iilli.i w M in«il ra /o i 
blades, and several unused paper bindles (R. 225-240, 255, 278; State's Exhibits 2-10). 
These items served as the basis for defendant's convictions. When the officer asked 
him about the pouch, defendant admitted that it v» as Ms, but denied knowledge or 
< m f iership of ils nmle i i l 1 Ill'11 ?SQ-1W), KK 1< 263-265, ?78; bm see II1 III \ Ml 322,, 
330). Defendant explained that he was in the area to try to sell some of his stainless 
steel tools which turned out to be nothing more than a manicure set (R. 280, 282, 286). 
Defendant testified .il trial "' I I • testified it was his 'recollection' ' that he "did" 
signal before making * mm, that 
J
 Although he stipulated to the facts on his motion to suppress (R. 164-167; see 
R. 39-40), and has not challenged the trial court's findings of fact on the motion as 
clearly erroneous, defendant's trial testimony contradicted those same facts on several 
key points 
white car" to him, and that he first saw the officer "swinging and waving an arm" at 
him, "had no idea that he was a police officer," and "thought he was some kind of 
fanatical maniac." (R. 320, 334). Although at first apparently admitting that he did 
see the lights on the police car (R. 320), defendant later testified that he didn't think the 
officer "even had police emergency lights on his vehicle." (R. 323). In explaining 
why he finally stopped, defendant testified: 
Because I think one of the things he took from the window in his car was 
to show me something that suggested he was a police officer. I am not 
sure if it was his badge. I am not sure what it was, but it did take a little 
bit of a spell for me to realize he was nobody that had any authority. He 
looked more like somebody you wouldn't know what to do with for doing 
what he was doing. He didn't look professional. 
(R. 323). Defendant nevertheless testified that he could see a "badge" because, "[the 
officer's] car came swinging up to the left of my car and that is the first time that I saw 
[the officer] that night, and I at no time even know [sic] that it was anybody behind 
me." I<L Defendant admitted that he does not wear glasses and had no problems with 
his eyesight that night (R. 334). 
When the officer initially asked about his movements to the right during the 
stop, defendant testified that, "[a]t the time, I didn't know what [the officer] was 
talking about." (R. 320-321). However, defendant explained, "I think now after 
thinking about this quite a bit, I realize indeed I was bumping across the top of the seat 
while I was putting on my seat belt." (R. 321). Defendant offered that he did not have 
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seat belt on." I^ L Defendant concluded, "I realize now that I could have been 
searching for my seat belt." (R. 324). 
Defendant testified that, when 'the officer asked linn to explain his movements 
biiotr slopping, hr iliilll in I I 'Ill lln ot l im (hull In w «'i i \\\u\)i to liislcn his seal hi ll 
because, "[a]t the time, I didn't realize that I was doing it. This was a realization after 
the fact " ^ ~~H Defendant later testified, "I only understood and came to this 
conclusion after the fact that it could have been possibly that I was stretching for the 
being pulled over. I was at that point starting to realize that this irate person over here 
next to me could be a police officer." (R 333-334). 
As to his use of the car, defendant initially testified that he was driving "our 
and that there are "six kids'" in his family "and at that time there were two parents" (R. 
317) Defendant was 45 years old at the time of his testimony (R. 315, 326), During 
cross examination, defendant responded in I lie prosecutor's questions: 
Q. Hov* old are the other kids in the family? 
A. Is that relevant? 
Q. Yes, it is. 
!l
""i Okaj I have a twin brother the same age as myself. I have a 
deceased little brother who is six years younger than I. I have an older 
brother which is three years older than I. And I have a set of twins that 
are, I think, approaching 30 now. They are Jeffrey and Parisy and they 
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are a tremendous family. I have a lot of respect for them and forgive me 
I don't see them often enough as I would like to at all. 
Q. I guess the question I am driving at, Mr. Stephens, is how many 
people are living at home with your parents? 
A. Actually, just my mother now. 
Q. Back on February 20th, who was living with your parents? 
A- I was as a caretaker? [sic] 
Q. No one else; is that correct? 
A. Just myself and all of the other family members come and go quite 
a bit, but they weren't permanently sleeping there though. 
Q. You are not suggesting to this jury that because it is your mother's 
car and registered in the Cromar name, which is your mother's name, that 
she would have a purse that had narcotics in it, are you? 
A. Of course not. 
(R. 328). Defendant also conceded on cross examination that he was driving the car 
the whole evening. IsL 
As for ownership of the leather pouch, defendant testified that he "definitely did 
not" tell the officers that the leather pouch was his (R. 321), and suggested that they 
may have misunderstood him because his voice was affected by cancer surgery, 
(although, he testified, his voice was actually worse at trial) (R. 315, 321-322). Later, 
defendant testified that it was "very disgusting to [him] to hear them claim that [he] 
had" admitted owning the pouch (R. 330). 
To explain the presence of the pouch in his car, defendant called a female friend 
to testify that defendant drove a female she had only met once and never saw again 
(identified only as "Debbie") to "some apartments on Redwood Road" that night (R. 
299-302; g££ also R. 317). According to the witness, "Debbie" had shown up 
20 
unannouritnJ mid npsei m llir witness's linnsr rim I ,,islnll I'm ;i nnlr iR ¥»0| Sinn11 slur 
did not really know "Debbie," 'the witness did not "even 'know why she came to my 
house" (R. 300; £££ also R. 304). This was especially so, since the witness did not 
drive, did not have a dri\ ei " s license, and did not even have a car. I$L; £££ also R. 
VS VhnrloTr iLruii i ^ testified \ha ,lv H<1 nl Jrfnidiiiii n \ happened !ie 
visiting, and who "didn't really want to" give this unknown person a ride, but that 
e\ c aitually "he did." LL; sfiealSQR. 318. . 
According to the defense witness, "Debbie* ' had "a bunch of bags with her""" (R. 
S :: me of them 
don't know, like a gym bag." IdL; see also R. 319. According to the witness, 
"Debbie" sat in the back seat behind defendant, and put her bags on the passenger side, 
benina the iront passenger seat where th, v>^ness was sitting (K >• •_. JOo. see also R. 
pouch found in defendant's car (R. 301-302). 
Although the witness testified she thought "Debbie" was probably 19 or 20 years 
HI >ld < IK. 31)41, defendant thought she was possibly 2b to MI"1U Jl I i 118 > i)efe n c |ant 
testified that she WJ^ u i lull mm i " | sn || ill1" I I i'i According It llir defense evidenee, 
The assertion in defendant's brief that "Debbie" « s a t m gg ^ ^ s e a t ^^[^ 
the passenger seat while being transported" (Def. Br. at 10), is unsupported by the 
record and is directly contradicted by the testimony defendant cites in support (R. 302). 
Indeed, defendant himself testified that "Debbie" sat directly behind him (see. R, 319). 
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the night of the traffic stop was the first and last time defendant ever saw "Debbie" (R. 
300,318). 
After agreeing that "Debbie" did not sit in the front seat, defendant testified, 
that is another place where the officers changed their story because that 
purse when I saw him pull it out, his arms was moving steady under that 
seat to reach almost to the back seat and it was where it could have been 
kicked quite easily from the position where that girl was. And so they 
changed their testimony and lied to say where they had gotten it. And it 
was despicable behavior for police officers to change their testimony to 
attempt to indict somebody unfairly. 
(R. 331; £££ also R. 332). Regarding the officers' purported lies, defendant concluded 
that he "suspected it was possibly it could have been some kind of repercussion they 
were directing at somebody, but I had no idea or not understanding why they were 
trying to direct it on me." (R. 332). 
Although it is clear the jury rejected defendant's testimony, defendant is 
essentially asking this Court to reject the jury's conclusion about his credibility. The 
Utah Supreme Court has written: 
When the evidence presented is conflicting or disputed, the jury serves as 
the exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the weight to 
be given particular evidence. [Case citations omitted] Ordinarily, a 
reviewing court may not reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but 
must resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of the jury verdict. [Case 
citation omitted] 
State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). Since the "unusual 
circumstances," discussed in Workman, that might justify a reviewing court's 
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reassessment ot wiilirss. rirdibib' in this rnsr Ihc inn "s credibility 
determination should not be disturbed. 
In short, given the 'weight of the prosecution's evidence balanced against 
defendant's improbable and self-serving testimony, tins cast* did nol lui 11 on a single 
ambition-, i" uiii ill Hionnmh. aiiiiiitniiill lh lln ruostYiilm iiiumln u'larK sine* (lie 
comment was objected to and a curative instruction was given. Defendant has failed to 
establish a reasonable likelihood that, but for this comment, he would have been 
acquitted. 
>NCLUSION 
Defendant's convictions should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^6Kday of May, 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
/BARNARD N. MADSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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RLE- $S?BSK? CCttSfST 
Third JifdiCia! District 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE THIRD JUDICIAL DIS^gjJG^ jggg 
III Mill Hill HUM MIM1 l i l l l l l M , III II II1 HI UTAH, 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Pla in t i f f 
v s . 
BRYAN JAY STEPHENS 
Defendant 
CASE WO. 951901961FS 
FINDINGS OF TACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
The above-ent. it led matter came before this court pursuant In 
Defendant's MOTION TO SUPPRESS on the 2nd day of January 1996 
challenging the search and subsequent seizure of controlled 
substances and drug paraphernalia. The defendant although not 
present was represented by his attorney of record, Robin K. 
Youngberg, the State was represented by attorney of record, 
Michael J. Christensen. 
The Court having heard the arguments of both the defendant 
and the State regarding the defendant's Motion to Suppress, now 
advisei following FINDINGS OF I'ACT ai 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. (in I i I i ii ii | ii Mi ill I ih i'i mil \ Hi L.111I | M M 1 I I I in 1 
Broadhead witnessed the defendant Bryan Jay Stephens violate the 
traffic code l>y falling to properly signal while turning left 
(£ inn wi 
11 Deputy Broadhead activated his overhead lights to effect a 
000041 
2 
traffic stop. The defendant did not immediately stop and made 
several rapid movements to the right prior to stopping. As 
Deputy Broadhead exited his vehicle and approached, the defendant 
made another rapid *stuffing" movement *to the right* 
3. The defendant denied making any stuffing movements when asked 
about his actions prior and after stopping by Deputy Broadhead. 
In response to Deputy Broadhead's query if he had any concealed 
weapons or contraband under the seat, the defendant said; "No, 
you're free to look if you want.11 
4. Because of the defendant's apparent extreme nervousness, 
Deputy Broadhead explained to the defendant his concern for his 
safety as well as the possibility that the defendant had placed a 
weapon or contraband under the front seat. Deputy Broadhead 
requested permission to check under the seat and the defendant 
responded "Go right ahead.M 
5. The defendant exited the vehicle and Deputy Broadhead looked 
under the right front seat where he observed the suspicious 
movement. Deputed Broadhead limited his search to the right 
front area and found a brown leather case under the right front 
seat. On opening the leather case, Deputy Broadhead found 
various controlled substances as well as drug paraphernalia. 
6. The defendant denied knowledge or ownership of the leather 
case at which time Deputy Broadhead then Mirandized the defendant 
and arrested him for possession of controlled substances and drug 
paraphernalia. 
0 0 0 0 4 2 
3 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. n 3 
LII fill li'ic stop is governed by a two prong test: <1) Was Deputy 
Broadhead#s action justified at its inception? -and (2) Was the 
r e s u 111 i II I • Set en Il::::;i c i i e 
circumstances justifying the interference in the first place? 
Terrv v. Ohio. „ 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 
Deputy Broadhead was constitutionally justified in stopping 
the defendant ""s vehicle for a txaffic violation committed in his 
prespi'ie • II-I 8 bate •» Lopez 8' 3 3 
stipulated by both sides). 
Deputy Broadhead's investigative questioning of the defendant 
t 
served to dispel his concern about the defendant's 
actions during * • course of the "traffic stop. During brief 
nt g, ill b d et a i 
defendant. State v. Grovier. 808 P.2d 133,136 (Utah 
(quoting United States v. Sharpe. 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105, 
Despite the purposes of a traffic stop, Deputy Broadhead's 
inquiries though unrelated to the traffic violation were 
O i l i CJI 1" 1 Ml I | I II 11 Ii I | | II III • '• • ^ ' l I C I IIIIIIMI I I I IIIIIII III II III 1 II i l l h l I I I M l l l l i i l 
suspicion. Lopez at 113I Specifically the defendant 
failed to immediately pull over when sir 1 1 i|  l the defendant 
m a d e s e v e i i t l I | ill IIII veiiii.'til . Liu I Ii i i n j i . i lie I o r e t o p p i n g , a n d 
0 0 0 0 4 3 
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after stopping as the officer approached his vehicle, (3) the 
defendant's denial of any ^stuffing" movements and apparent 
extreme nervousness, and (4) Deputy Broadhead's concern for his 
safety as veil as the possibility that the defendant was 
concealing a veapon or contraband. 
5. The State has met its burden by shoving the defendant 
voluntarily and specifically consented to Deputy Broadhead's 
search of the front right area of his vehicle when (1) in 
response to the inquiry about weapons and contraband he said 
••You're free to look if you want." and (2) in response to a 
request to search he said "Go right ahead.91 Grovier § 136. The 
lav does not require a suspect to be informed of his or her right 
to refuse or that the consent be written. State v. Contrel. 886 
P.2d 107, 111 (Utah Ct.App. 1994), State v. Delanev, 669 P.2d 4, 
8 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
6. The legality of the traffic stop coupled with the absence of 
any illegal conduct by the deputy, and the defendant's voluntary 
consent supports denial of the defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 655 (Utah App. 1992). 
Moreover, in State v. Bradford. 839 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) the Utah Court of Appeals said: * If, while conducting a 
legitimate Terry search of the interior of the automobile, the 
officer should, as here, discover contraband other than weapons, 
he clearly cannot be required to ignore the contraband, and the 
Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression in such 
circumstances. w 
0 0 0 0 4 4 
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DECISION 
Based on above Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, 
11 Deputy m i I.MIKMII ' i, search of tne 
defendant's vehicle was reasonable and limited, and conducted 
with the defendant's specific voluntary consent. The defendant's 
Dated this _/3 day of March, 199^^ 
fi<^045 
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1 7-Eleven. Those are manufactured or they are made in such 
2 a way so you are able to snort various types of powder 
3 controlled substances. You will be able to handle those 
4 and see those. 
5 You will also be able to look at the mirror. As 
6 you look at the mirror and the glass, you will see the 
7 lines that are across that. And again as the officer 
8 testified, they are utilized for the razor blades cutting 
9 those agents into a reasonable dose that is convenient for 
10 drawing them up your nose and snort them. The marijuana 
11 itself can be smoked out of the pipe. All of those 
12 particular items could be utilized in this pack for 
13 purposes of drug ingestion, okay. And you have got a 
14 whole long lengthy list of what those items are used for. 
15 But if they are utilized in any type if a way, it could be 
16 an innocent thing such as a straw or a razor blade, or a 
17 mirror or a pipe, when it is utilized in the ingestion of 
18 drugs, then it becomes paraphernalia. And that is why he 
19 was charged also with that particular offense. 
20 You may say, "Well, yeah we have got Mr. Stephens 
21 charged with a crime. There is no victim here with regard 
22 to those offenses• We have only taken roughly two hours 
23 to present the case to you today, why all of the big fuss 
24 and bother to occupy your time for a day? Well, you all 
25 know the impact that this type of offense has. 
A A A 9 R 4 
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1 MR. YOUNGBERG: Objection, judge. 
2 THE COURT: Sustained and Mr. Christensen I am 
3 going to ask that you refrain from making that argument 
4 and, members of the jury, let me just simply admonish you 
5 that your verdict in this case, of course, must be based 
6 solely and totally upon the evidence that is introduced 
7 during this particular case and, of course, you must not 
8 be swayed by public opinion or public feeling. Your 
9 decision must be based solely upon the evidence introduced 
10 during this case. You may proceed, Mr. Christensen. 
11 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
12 You have the right to consider with regard to 
13 this defendant the issues of credibility, the issues of 
14 whether or not those officers are telling the truth, 
15 whether or not they have some motive to lie. I would 
16 suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, there has been 
17 absolutely no motive to lie here today on the officers' 
18 part. In fact, on cross examination for Mr. Youngberg, he 
19 asked Deputy Broadhead, "Why has it taken so long to get 
20 this case tried?" Well, if Deputy Broadhead had some 
21 reason to get on the stand and perjure himself and had 
22 that big of an interest in the case of convicting Mr. 
23 Stephens, don't you think he would have been on that case 
24 and had that thing filed the very next day with the other 
25 officers and gone from there? 
n o n a s 2 
